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Disappointed Bidder Standing to
Challenge a Government Contract Award:
A Proposal for Change in Kentucky
Procurement Law
BY DAVID S. SULLIVAN*
INTRODUCTION
iven the modem prevalence of government contracting and
projects, bid protest actions are increasingly being brought at
the state and local level.' Some possible reasons for such
developments include increased competition among potential contractors,
heightened bidder awareness of their enforceable legal rights, or a mix-
ture of these and other factors.2 As contractual bidding with the govern-
ment represents a highly involved process with serious implications, 3 it is
important that contractors be aware of the right to, and requirements of,
a bid protest action. This Note deals with one of these requirements,
namely the standing of a disappointed bidder to challenge a government
contract awarded to another party Current Kentucky case law demes
standing to an unsuccessful bidder m many circumstances,4 and is m need
of reformation.
Typically, both state and local entities have mandatory statutory
competitive bidding procedures for awarding public contracts. Kentucky
is no different, m that "every expenditure of public funds by [the]
* J.D. expected 2000, University of Kentucky.
'See David E. Rosengren & Thomas G. Libnzzi, Bid Protests: Substance and
Procedure on Publicly Funded Construction Projects, CONSTRUCTION LAw., Jan.
1987, at 1.
2See id.
' See id.
4 See Healthamenca Corp. v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 697 S.W.2d 946 (Ky.
1985) (rejecting disappointed bidder standing m the absence of fraud, collusion, or
dishonesty).
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Commonwealth under any contract or business agreement"' must
comply with the various provisions of the Kentucky Model Procurement
Code ("KMPC"). 6 This Note is not concerned with specific KMPC
requirements, but rather with the remedies and judicial recourse available
to a disappointed bidder acting within the ambit of the Code.
KMPC section 45A.285 permits contractor protests, on which the
decision of the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet is
final.7 This provision has been interpreted to mean" 'final and conclusive'
for administrative purposes, not as a barrier against judicial review " 8 Such
"judicial review" would be implicated in those situations in which a
contractor/bidder is denied a government contract by the awarding agency,
files a timely protest under KMPC section 45A.285, receives an unfavor-
able decision, and seeks redress in ajudicial forum after having exhausted
all available administrative remedies. In terms of scope, this Note and its
consideration of standing and other relevant issues applies primarily to
those disappointed bidders who are not taxpayers within the state of
Kentucky 9
In light of the contractual, proprietary, public, and other interests
relating to the government/competitive bidding process, this Note calls for
a change in Kentucky law to allow unsuccessful bidders standing to
challenge a public contract award for a variety of grievances. While
Kentucky courts allow bid protest suits where fraudulent, collusive, or
dishonest circumstances are involved, 0 such limited grants of standing are
not enough to adequately protect either private contractor or public
interests. Part I gives a background discussion of both the competitive
bidding process and standing doctrine." Part II discusses the current state
of Kentucky procurement law as it applies to government contracts and
notes the law of other states whose courts have denied the existence of
standing within the disappointed bidder context. 2 Various policy argu-
ments for unsuccessful bidder standing are given in Part 11I.1 Parts IV and
' KY. REV STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 45A.020(l) (Michle 1997 &
Supp. 1998).6 See K.R.S. § 45A (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1998).
7 See id. § 45A.285.
8 Pendleton Bros. Vending, Inc. v. Kentucky Fin. & Admin. Cabinet, 758
S.W.2d 24, 28 (Ky. 1988).
9 See infra note 45.
'
0 See Healthamenca Corp. v Humana Health Plan, Inc., 697 S.W.2d 946,948
(Ky 1985).
"See infra notes 16-35 and accompanying text.
'
2 See infra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
'3 See infra notes 47-73 and accompanying text.
DISAPPOINTED BIDDER STANDING
V, respectively, detail the legal (based upon contractual and proprietary
theories) and residual arguments for generalized standing, as well as
possible theories under which such a cause of action may properly be
brought.1 4 Part VI concludes that the aforementioned arguments collec-
tively require a change m Kentucky law, after which disappointed bidders
would be uniformly granted the requisite standing to seek judicial review
of government bidding procedures and/or contract awards) 5
I. BACKGROUND DISCUSSION OF BIDDING AND STANDING
A. The Competitive Bidding Process
Generally stated, competitive bidding procedure is governed by
statutory law requiring that public or government contracts be awarded to
the lowest (or ughest, for purchasing and other acquisition contracts)
responsible bidder submitting aresponsive bidproposal.16 In order to grasp
tis assertion fully, the meaning of its constituent terms must be explored.
A "responsive" bid is one that purports to do exactly what is specified in
the bidding request; it is improper to give a government job to one whose
bid materially vanes from the requirements of the bid invitation.'
Insignificant discrepancies usually do not bring about bid rejection. 8
Furthermore, a "responsible" bidder is "one who can or will be able to
perform as promised"'9 within his bid figure. A responsibility determina-
tion involves consideration of the bidder's financial condition, reputation,
efficiency, experience, resources, facilities, and judgment.20 The competi-
tive bidding process is intended to provide the general public with low-
priced, high-quality projects,"' and the statutory requirements of respon-
siveness and responsibility help state and local governments achieve that
goal.
14 infra notes 74-142 and accompanying text.
1See infra Part VI and accompanying text.
See Kenneth M. Cushman et al., Contractor's Rights and Duties: Bid Dis-
putes and Associated Problems, Diffenng Site Conditions and Site Inspection
Clauses, Change Orders, and Contract TechnicalDefenses, 391 PRACTICING LAW
INST./REAL EST. LAW & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 61, 63 (1993).
" See id. at 64-65.
18 See id. at 65.
19 Id. at 67
20 See id.
21 See Rosengren & Librizzi, supra note 1, at 10.
2 See K.R.S. § 45A (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1998). The KMPC provides a good
example of state competitive bidding statutes generally, and ofresponsiveness and
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In terms of procedure, competitive bidding involves several different
steps. Initially, the project owner.or agency publishes a bid advertisement
giving notice of whatever service is required, including working specifica-
tions and conditions, as well as bidder qualifications?13 Additionally, the
published advertisement sets forth a time table for bid submissions,
identifies the location of necessary contractual documents, and provides
bidder instructions (explaining how the required forms must be
completed).24 Following the submission of these documents to the
appropriate public authority (per statutory mandate), and in accordance
with the aforementioned advertisement, all bids are simultaneously
considered and the low bidder identified.z5 Subsequently, the requesting
agency decides upon the lowest (or highest, where appropriate) responsive
bid and responsible bidder,26 to whom the contract is ultimately awarded.27
These steps of the competitive bidding process provide checkpoints at
which the conduct of both the government entities and contractors may be
evaluated. 28 Furthermore, such procedures effectively use competition
among bidders to prevent governmental favoritism and secure the best
work at the lowest possible price.29 Given the importance of the policies
served by the competitive bidding system, procedural or other irregularities
at any stage should be sufficient to support the standing of a disappointed
bidder to judicially challenge such impropriety
B. Standing
Summarily defined, "[s]tanding 'is a judge-made doctrine used to
determine whether a party is entitled to judicial relief."30 Standing requires
a court to decide "whether the party has a sufficiently personal stake m the
responsibility requirements in particular.
23 See DAVID A. MCCARTHY, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL
261 (4th ed. 1995).
24See Rosengren & Librizzi, supra note 1, at 1.
See id.26 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
2See Rosengren & Librzzi, supra note 1, at 1.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 23, at 261.29See 10 EUGENE MCQUILLN, THE LAW OFMUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.29
(3d ed. 1999). McQuillin's multi-volume work provides an rn-depth, comprehen-
sive consideration of municipal and government corporate law.
30Metropolitan AirResearch Testing Auth. v. Metropolitan Gov't, 842 S.W.2d
611,615 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Knienm v. Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806,
808 (Tenn. 1976)).
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outcome of the controversy to warrant the exercise of the court's power on
its behalf."'" In determining whether the proper party is bringing a
particular claim, courts generally act in accordance with the following
requirements:
To have standing, a party must have a sufficient interest m the contro-
versy to assure an adversary presentation. a party must have an interest
m the alleged wrong other than that of a member of the general public;
and a party must show that his legal rights or privileges have been
invaded.32
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has expressly adopted this rule.33 Within
the present context, only the second and third aspects-interest in the
alleged wrong and invasion of legal rights or privileges-are at issue.
Clearly, a disappointed bidder represents a party sufficiently "adverse" to
an awarding entity for standing purposes. Conversely, whether an
unsuccessful bidder can prove a sufficient interest that has been wrongfully
invaded presents a difficult question (and one susceptible to various
answers). While Kentucky courts have uniformly responded in the
negative,34 tns Note maintains that such an interest should be recognized
for both policy and legal reasons.35
II. KENTUCKY AND OTHER LAW REJECTING
STANDING WITHIN THE DISAPPOINTED BIDDER CONTEXT
Assuming the administrative protest remedies of the Kentucky Model
Procurement Code have been exhausted (or are otherwise mapplicable),36
311d. at 615 (citing Browning-Ferrs Indus. v. City of Oak Ridge, 644 S.W.2d
400,402 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982)).
32 Jean F Rydstrom, Annotation, Who is Entitled to Attack Urban Renewal
Projects Undertaken Pursuant to Federal Housing Act of 1949, as Amended (42
U.S.C. §§ 1441-1469), 8 A.L.R. FED. 415, 427 (1971).33 See Carrico v. City of Owensboro, 511 S.W.2d 677,679 (Ky. 1974) (quoting
and adopting the view taken by Rydstrom, supra note 32, at 427, within the context
of a complainant seeking to challenge a local urban renewal project).
I' See Healthamerica Corp. v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 697 S.W.2d 946,948
(Ky. 1985).31 SeegenerallyMCCARTHY, supra note 23, at 422-30 (discussing the rationale,
purposes, and policies of standing within the local government context).
36 See K.R.S. § 45A.285 (Miclue 1997 & Supp. 1998); see also id. § 45A.343
(providing that a local public agency "may" adopt the KMPC, making the Act
1999-2000]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the current position of Kentucky law is clearly stated in Healthamenca
Corp. v. Humana Health Plan, Inc." In denying a local health insurance
corporation's action to prevent the granting of a state employee contract to
another organization, the Healthamrenca court held that "absent a showing
of fraud, collusion, or dishonesty, a disappointed bidder has no standing to
judicially challenge the award of a public contract to another bidder."'3 In
support of this ruling, the court noted that for purposes of standing, an
unsuccessful bidder lacks a sufficient legal interest in a contract entered
into by the government with a competitor. 9
In Ohio River Conversions, Inc. v. City of Owensboro,4° a similar case
involving competitive bidding for a city-owned boat dock, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals elaborated upon the legal basis for denying disappointed
bidder standing. The Court found that government solicitation of offers,
alone, does not impose any contractual obligations.4 Consequently, an
unsuccessful bidder in Kentucky lacks standing to challenge an award
pursuant thereto vis-A-vis either the government, the relevant agency, or a
fellow competitor.42
Behind such legal decisions looms the policy supporting them. A non-
Kentucky case, Gannett Co. v. Delaware,43 best states the policy rationale
of the majority rule denying standing to disappointed bidders within the
government contract context. In striking down a challenge to the award of
a public contract to another bidder, the Delaware court relied upon the
overwhelmingly accepted notion that competitive bidding laws and
practices are primarily intended to protect the taxpaying public and not
individual bidders. 44 Consequently, taxpaying members of the public, and
inapplicable in certain situations).
37fHealthamenca, 697 S.W.2d at 946.
3 1 Id. at 948. But see Pendleton Bros. Vending, Inc. v. Kentucky Fin. & Admin.
Cabinet, 758 S.W.2d 24, 25-26 (Ky. 1988) (discussing the purposes and policies
of the KMJC and recognizing a cause of action and specific exception to the
Healthamernca rule under facts indicating that certain KMPC statutory procedures
were disregarded for reasons of political patronage).
39See Healthamenca, 697 S.W.2d at 948.
40Ouo River Conversions, Inc. v. City ofOwensboro, 663 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1984).41 See Id. at 761.
42 See id. (citing R.G. Wilmott Coal Co. v. State Purchasing Comm'n, 54
S.W.2d 634, 636 (Ky. 1932)).
43Gannett Co. v. Delaware, No. CIV.A. 12815, 1993 WL 19714, at*1 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 11, 1993).
" See id. at *3.
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only such persons, should have standing to challenge an improperly
awarded government contract.45 The majority of other jurisdictions are in
accord with the Kentucky and Delaware views.' While Healthamenca,
Ohio River, and Gannett collectively paint a grim picture from the
viewpoint of a Kentucky contractor, other states and courts have recog-
nzed both policy and legal grounds for allowing a disappointed bidder
standing to maintain a bid protest cause of action.
III. POLICY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF DISAPPOINTED
BIDDER STANDING TO CHALLENGE A GOVERNMENT CONTRACT AWARD
When considered in their entirety, the most persuasive arguments for
a change in Kentucky law that would grant disappointed bidders standing
to sue on public contract awards are based upon public policy Standing is
a malleable doctrine created and used by courts to ensure that the proper
party is bringing an asserted claim.47 It may be argued that within the
context of government contracts, theprinciples ofstanding should facilitate
'See id. Taxpayerstandingto challenge government/mumcipal contractawards
is uniformly recognized. See also Federal Elec. Corp. v. Fasi, 527 P.2d 1284 (Haw.
1974); American Totalisator Co. v. Seligman, 414 A.2d 1037 (Pa. 1980); Pioneer
Co. v. Hutchinson, 220 S.E.2d 894 (W Va. 1975), overruled on other grounds by
State ex rel. E.D.S. Fed. Corp. v. Ginsberg, 259 S.E.2d 618 (W Va. 1979).
Consequently, a Kentucky corporate (or other) bidder who is also a taxpayer will
ordinarily have the requisite standing to bring a disappointed bidder cause of
action.
"For other states and cases following the Kentucky (and majority) rule against
disappointed bidder standing m the government contract context, see, for example,
Communications Sys., Inc. v. City of Danville, 880 F.2d 887, 891 (6th Cir. 1989)
(recognizing the Kentucky rule that contracts awarded by a municipality cannot be
set aside without a showing of fraud, collusion, or dishonesty); Sowell's Meats &
Servs., Inc. v. McSwain, 788 F.2d 226, 229 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that an
unsuccessful bidder lacks standing to question the awarding of state contracts under
both the majority rule and South Carolina law); Apcoa, Inc. v. City of New Haven,
No. CV9503702205, 1995 WL 155434, *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 1995)
(stating that absent fraud, corruption, or favoritism an unsuccessful bidder lacks
standing to challenge the award of a public contract); State ex rel. Mid-Missouri
Limestone, Inc. v. County of Calloway, 962 S.W.2d 438,441 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that a disappointed bidder has no legal interest and therefore no legal
standing to assert a cause of action); I.S.C. Distribs., Inc. v. Trevor, 903 P.2d 170,
178 (Mont. 1995) (noting Montana case law holding that unsuccessful bidders lack
standing to challenge the award of a government contract).
4 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
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rather than hinder suits that further the public interest. In accordance with
this notion, the following cases and opinions, taken from various states,
endorse an unsuccessful bidder as the proper party to institute a bid protest
action. Generally stated, the decisions and holdings outlined below were
handed down in jurisdictions operating under a statutory competitive
bidding scheme. Consequently, their rationales directly relate to the issue
currently being considered.
Exammmg the award of a local government vehicle inspection and
maintenance contract, the Tennessee Court of Appeals m Metropolitan Air
Research Testing Authority v. Metropolitan Government4" noted that an
increasing number of courts have permitted suits by disappointed bidders,
and held accordingly After recognizing the existence and significance of
both bidder and public interests m fair bidding procedures, the court stated
that "[u]nsuccessful bidders are most likely to have an incentive to bring
suit to compel agencies to comply with the requirements controlling
government contracts." 9 Such an assertion is logical in that a taxpaying
member of the general public may have a. legal interest in the expenditure
of government funds sufficient to support standing,50 but such an individual
ordinarily has neither the time, nor the inclination, nor the resources to
challenge a government contract awarded to an improper bidder or in
violation of competitive bidding requirements. A disappointed contractor
bidding on a public job is more willing and able to bring a bid protest
action and, consequently, should be legally recognized in Kentucky as
possessing sufficient standing to do so.
Particularly relevant to the present issue is the court's holding that an
unsuccessful bidder on a government contract need not prove fraud or that
it would have been awarded the contract but for the challenged conduct of
the agency 5' Assuming the presence of bids that are both responsive and
actively considered, "unsuccessful bidders [should] have standing to
vindicate the public's interest in competitive bidding."2 This rationale and
conclusion, emanating from the court of a neighboring state, persuasively
supports an expansion of Kentucky law that would generally give standing
to disappointed bidders questioning the propriety of a public contract
award.
48 Metropolitan Air Research Testing Auth. v. Metropolitan Gov't, 842 S.W.2d
611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
4 91 Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
" See supra note 45 and cases cited therein.
5' See Metropolitan, 842 S.W.2d at 617
52d.
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In relation to the expenditure ofgovemment funds, it may be conceded
that competitive biddingrequirements indirectly (with the awarding agency
as an intermediary) involve the interests of, and benefit, state and local
taxpayers. However, the state of Ilinols recognizes that the public
procurement scheme directly affects contractors bidding thereunder. In
Cardinal Glass Co. v. Board ofEducation, s the court considered a local
statutory requirement that a government contract be awarded to the lowest
(or highest, where appropriate) responsible bidder and recognized that a
disappointed low (or high) bidder has standing to bring an appropriate bid
protest action. Similar to, and in corroboration with Tennessee's views, the
Cardinal Glass court supported its position by stating that:
As a practical matter, securing compliance with the statute, and thereby
the benefits to taxpayers, will be more effectively handled by unsuccess-
fl bidders, who for the most part have a greater stake in such matters, and
greater resources, than an individual taxpayer. In the long run, permitting
such suits by bidders will work to advance the public interest by
securing the goal of tax savings. 54
In light of this rationale, and m accordance with traditional standing
principles,5 the court held that "unsuccessful lowest responsible bidders
are within the zone of protection! 56 of the competitive bidding statute at
issue and have standing to challenge a violation of relevant regulatory
notice requirements. With respect to whether Kentucky common law
should be modified to grant standing to disappointed bidders within the
context of government contract awards, even m the absence of fraud,
collusion, or dishonesty,5 Cardinal Glass provides an unqualified,
affirmative response.
Overruling a long line of contrary case law, the court in Walt Bennett
Ford, Inc. v. Pulaski County Special School District5" allowed a disap-
pointed bidder on a public school bus contract to sue for alleged wrongs
occurring within the competitive bidding process. In accordance with the
I Cardinal Glass Co. v. Board of Educ., 447 N.E.2d 546 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
TMId. at 549.
5 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
56 Cardinal Glass, 447 N.E.2d at 549.
517 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
5 WaltBennett Ford, Inc. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 624 S.W.2d 426
(Ark. 1981).
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previously discussed decisions, 9 the Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed
the notion that competitive bidding requirements should be judicially
enforced by taxpayers only, and asserted that "the most practical way to
protect the public interest is to allow unsuccessful bidders to seek judicial
review of any alleged wrong in the [public] contracting procedure." While
Walt Bennett Ford's holding and rationale supporting unsuccessful bidder
standing to challenge government contract awards are important, the most
significant aspect of the case for purposes of this Note involves the
Arkansas court's broad characterization of the possible grounds for such a
suit. Under Arkansas law, a disappointed contractor bidding for a govern-
ment project may assert a cause of action based upon any inpropnety in
the contractual awarding process.61 In other words, allowing unsuccessful
bidders to bring an appropriate protest action for reasons other than fraud,
collusion, or dishonesty62 better serves both public taxpayer and contractor
interests in cost-effective government contracts.63 The majority view that
competitive bidding statutes are intended to benefit the public generally
and not private contractors ignores the fact that such contractors stand in
the best position to defend and protect the public interest, as well as their
own. In light of these arguments and observations, Kentucky law should be
modified to embrace a more permissive approach to disappointed bidder
standing.
See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
W alt Bennett Ford, 624 S.W.2d at 428.
61 See id. (granting standing to sue for "alleged wrongs" in furtherance of the
public interest).
62 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of
the Kentucky rule).
63 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Low cost to the public represents
one of the primary goals of the competitive bidding system.
64 For additional states and cases upholding the standing of an unsuccessful
bidder to challenge a government contract on policy and public interest grounds,
see, for example, Metropolitan Express Servs., Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 23 F.3d
1367, 1371 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a disappointed bidder has standing to
challenge the award of a contract not fairly bid); AT/COMM, Inc. v. Illinois State
Toll Highway Auth., No. 96C6961, 1997 WL 222875, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24,
1997) (recognizing standing to sue the government for failure to comply with the
legal requirements of the bidding process); M.A. Stephen Constr. Co. v Borough
of Rumson, 308 A.2d 380, 384 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1973) (stating that suits by
disappointed bidders claiming entitlement to a government contract award serve
the public interest); In re HHM Assocs. v. Appleton, 597 N.Y.S.2d 894, 896 (Sup.
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The foregoing cases from Tennessee, Illinois, andArkansas65 show that
other jurisdictions readily allow an unsuccessful bidder on a government
contract to sue the awarding authority on grounds other than "fraud,
collusion, or dishonesty," and do so for legitimate policyreasons. Clearly,
a disappointed contractor represents the most ready, willing, and able party
to bring such suits, and is therefore better able to protect the public interests
m both low-priced government projects67 and fair bidding generally 68
Specifically, protest actions were allowed in the previously considered
cases for alleged violations of statutory bidding requirements,69 unfair
bidding practices that favor one bidder over another,7" a cogmzable
economic injury traceable to a government action," and illegal official
actions within the competitive bidding process.' Such decisions, including
the grounds for suit recognized within them and the policy rationales
underlying them, strongly support a relaxation of Kentucky common law
in this area.73
Ct. 1993) (finding that standing to challenge an improper bidding process serves
to protect the public interest); Albert Elia Bldg. Co. v. New York State Urban Dev
Corp., 388 N.Y.S.2d 462, 466 (App. Div. 1976) (holding that allowing disap-
pointed bidder standing to attack an illegal official action furthers the public
interest); Browning-Ferns Indus. v. City of Oak Ridge, 644 S.W.2d 400, 402-03
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (asserting that an economic mjury traceable to the public
authority supports standing, even in the absence of bad faith or fraud).
65See supra notes 48-64 and accompanying text
See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
67See In re HHM Assocs. v. Appleton, 597 N.Y.S.2d 894, 896 (Sup. Ct. 1993)
(holding that a process that treats bidders unfairly adversely affects the public by
discouraging bidders from participating in the process, thereby decreasing
competition and raising prices).
68 See Metropolitan Air Research Testing Auth. v. Metropolitan Gov't, 842
S.W.2d 611, 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); see also quotation atsupra note 54.
69 See Metropolitan, 842 S.W.2d at 618.
70 See Metropolitan Express Servs., Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 23 F.3d 1367,
1371 (8th Cir. 1994).
" See Browning-Fers Indus. v. City of Oak Ridge, 644 S.W.2d 400, 402
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
'See AlbertEliaBldg. Co. v. New York State Urban Dev Corp., 388N.Y.S.2d
462, 465-66 (App. Div. 1976).
' See Walt Bennett Ford, Inc. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 624 S.W.2d
426 (Ark. 1981); Cardinal Glass Co. v. Board of Educ., 447 N.E.2d 546 (IlL. App.
Ct. 1983); Metropolitan, 842 S.W.2d at 611. See also supra note 64 for additional
cases involving unsuccessful bidder suits.
1999-2000]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
IV OTHER JURISDICTIONS' LEGAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF
DISAPPOINTED BIDDER STANDING TO CHALLENGE
A GOVERNMENT CONTRACT AwARD
A. Existence of a Contractual Interest or Injury
Kentucky law is clearthat agovernmentbid advertisement alone does not
contractually bind the requesting public authority 74 This position represents
the majority view that "[a] notice of intention to receive bids does not
constitute an offer but rather a mere solicitation of offers. Thus a notice does
not, in and ofitself, impose any contractual obligation."75 Despite this lack of
legally enforceable contractual rights, numerous jurisdictions have held that
a disappointed bidder has a sufficient legal, equitable, or economic interest
in an improperly awarded public contract to maintain a suit against the
relevant granting agency.76 These decisions generally arise under a statutory
competitive bidding system,' and therefore are directly applicable to the
issues presently under consideration.
After contemplating the possible economic consequences ofwrongfilly
losing a government contract, the Sixth Circuit Court ofAppeals in Owen of
Georgia, Inc. v. Shelby County78 heldthatthe disappomtedbidderat issue had
a "special pecuniary interest' 79 in an awarded public contract. This interest
gave the bidder standing to challenge the contractual grant in question as
illegal under local statutory competitive bidding procedures."0 As stated by
the court, "a prospective low bidder clearly has economic interests at
stake which give it standing."8 A bidder's "economic interests" arguably
include both loss of business and profits.82 Stated in different but related
terms, the Metropolitan court wrote "the loss of an opportunity to receive or
to compete for a public contract is a distinct injury sufficient to provide a
disappointed bidder with standing." 3 Considering that Owen was heard and
decided by the Sixth Circuit, its arguments stand out as both persuasive and
74 See Ohio River Conversions, Inc. v. City of Owensboro, 663 S.W.2d 759,
761 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
7-172 C.J.S. Supp. Public Contracts § 11 (1975).
76 See supra Part Im.
77 See Metropolitan, 842 S.W.2d at 617; Cardinal Glass, 447 N.E.2d at 548.
78 Owen of Georgia, Inc. v. Shelby County, 648 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1981).
7 9 Id. at 1089.
'oSee id.
8 Id.
82 See id.
83Metropolitan Air Research Testing Auth. v. Metropolitan Gov't, 842 S.W.2d
611, 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
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relevant for proposing changes to Kentucky law. Owen's holding provides
both economic and contractual grounds for expanding Kentucky's standing
rules to include a disappointed bidder seeking to attack a particular public
contract award or procedure.
In considering a state competitive bidding law requiring that public
contracts be let to the lowest (or highest) responsible bidder, the Supreme
Court of Georgia in Hilton Construction Co. v. Rockdale County Board of
Education4 found that a lowest qualified bidder asserting a violation of
relevant fair bidding regulations had a legally protected interest in the public
contract at issue.85 A similar conclusion should follow from the KMPC and
its lowest responsible bidder provisions,86 which are analogous to those of
Georgia 7 and other states.88 Despite the majority view that a responsive bid
fails to form an enforceable contract per se,89 an unsuccessful bidder's loss of
present (and perhaps future) business, profits, and other economic benefits
collectively provide enough to support that party's standing to bring a bid
protest claim. Other jurisdictions have so held, and current Kentucky law
should be changed accordingly.
B. Recognition of a Constitutional or Property Interest Sufficient
to Support Standing
As an alternative to the previous contractual interest argument, a
disappointed bidder on a public contract could have a recognized property
84 Hilton Constr. Co. v. Rockdale County Bd. of Educ., 266 S.E.2d 157 (Ga.
1980).85 See id. at 161.
86 See K.R.S. § 45A.110 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1998) (requirmg a written
determination of bidder responsibility); id. § 45A.075(1) (listing one method in
which the state contract may be awarded); id. § 45A.080(2) (stating that under the
above method the contract shall go to the lowest bid or lowest evaluated bid).87 SeeHilton, 266 S.E.2d at 161.
88 See Cardinal Glass Co. v. Board of Educ., 447 N.E.2d 546,549 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983); Albert Elia Bldg. Co. v. New York State Urban Dev Corp., 388 N.Y.S.2d
462, 465-66 (App. Div. 1976).
89 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
1o See, e.g., Quincy Ornamental Iron Works, Inc. v Findlen, 228 N.E.2d 453,
455 (Mass. 1967) (upholding disappointed bidder standing and stating that the
possibility of receiving a public contract award is sufficient for standing to sue);
Barnes v. Binghamton Urban Renewal Agency, 487 N.Y.S.2d 519, 522 (Sup. Ct.
1987) (holding that competitive bidding laws requiring an award to the lowest
responsible bidder give standing to the lowest responsible bidder).
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interest, which, if found, cannot be depnved in violation of statutory and,
ultimately, due process protections. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State subjects any citizen of the United
States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured m an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 91
As a general rule, maintaining a § 1983 action in federal court requires
unlawful government conduct resulting in an invasion of a "private,
substantive, legally protected mterest."9 Within the present context,
disappointed bidder standing under § 1983 depends upon the existence of a
recognized property interest m the contract created by relevant state law
supporting a "claim of entitlement to the award 93 because the potential
plaintiff is the lowest (or highest) responsible and responsive bidder.94
Assuming such a property interest is present, due process notions give the
unsuccessful bidder a right to the fair exercise of governmental discretion in
making the public contract award; any deprivation of this constitutes an
"actionable wrong."' Given an actionable wrong, the person or entity
wronged should be recognized as having standing to challenge the inJuriOUs
conduct of the offending government official or agency in a judicial
proceeding.
In those jurisdictions that have considered the unconstitutional depriva-
tion of a property interest as that concept relates to disappointed bidders, the
leading and most persuasive opinion is that of Three Rivers Cablevision, Inc.
v. City ofPittsburgh.6 In reviewing Pittsburgh's award of a cable television
contract under local law, the Three Rivers court noted that a significant
property interest deserving judicial protection can arise from state statutory
competitive bidding "schemes and customs which create legitimate claims of
entitlement to the benefits which they confer."97 Elaborating upon this notion,
9142 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
92 Kathleen M. Dorr, Annotation, Standing of Disappointed Bidder on Public
Contract to SeekDamages Under 42 USCS § 1983forPublicAuthorities'Alleged
Violation ofBidding Procedures, 86 A.L.R. FED. 904, 906 (1988).
93 Id. at 907
94 See id.
95 Id.
96 Three Rivers Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 502 F Supp. 1118 (W.D.
Pa. 1980).
971Id. at 1127
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the court quoted the following conclusion from Board ofRegents v. Roth:98
"[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it."9 In light of this and the above-stated
principles,"° the Three Rivers court recognized and upheld a disappointed
claimant's property interest m, and right to, an awardedpublic contract under
certain circumstances. I0 Assuming there is a competitive bidding procedure,
with which an unsuccessful bidder has complied and a successful bidder has
not, under Three Rivers there exists an arbitrary and therefore wrongful
governmental deprivation of a recognized proprietary interest (created by
state bidding law). This results in an actionable injury under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and its due process protections. 2
Though ordinarily applied in federal court, the Three Rivers holding and
§ 1983 provide additional support for the recognition of unsuccessful bidder
standing in state forums. In refusing to recognize such standing, Kentucky
courts bothpreventunsuccessful bidders from vindicatingtheir constitutional
rights and risk being overruled on due process grounds. Given a Kentucky
law or procedure that entitles the disappointed bidder to the contract at issue,
and an nproper deial ofthat contract, the rejected contractor should be able
to seek judicial relief on both § 1983 due process and fairness grounds. 3
9
' Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
9 Three Rivers, 502 F Supp. at 1127 (quoting Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at
577).
" See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text; see also Three Rivers, 502
F Supp. at 1128-29.
"Io See Three Rivers, 502 F Supp. at 1131.
102 See id.
" 
3 For other cases involving disappointed bidder standing to claim unlawful
deprivation of a recognized property interest in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
due process of law, see, for example, Pataula Elec. Membership Corp. v
Whitworth, 951 F.2d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 1992) (recognizing a constitutionally
protected property interest in a public contract award under Georgia competitive
bidding law); Sowell's Meats & Servs., Inc. v. McSwam, 788 F.2d 226,228 (4th
Cir. 1986) (implying that it is possible for state statutes to create a legal property
interest in a disappointed bidder on state contractual awards, which would give the
bidder standing to sue under § 1983); HaughtonElevatorDiv v. Louisiana, 367 So.
2d 1161, 1165 (La. 1979) (finding a property right in the lowest responsible bidder
such that notice and a due process hearing is required before bidder disqualification
is permissible); ISC Distribs., Inc. v. Trevor, 903 P.2d 170, 173 (Mont. 1995)
(noting that a due process claim requires "a definite property interest and that
such interest was, under color of state law, abridged without appropriate process")
(quoting Curtis Ambulance, Inc. v. Board ofCounty Comm'r, 811 F.2d 1371, 1375
(10th Cir. 1987)).
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Disappointed bidder standing should follow from the recognition of such
significant interests.
V ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS AND THEORIES SUPPORTING
A DISAPPOINTED BIDDER'S STANDING TO CHALLENGE A
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT AWARD
A. Federal Procurement Law
Although federal procurement statutory and case law under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")' °4 is technically inapplicable to the
issue being considered, it adds meaningful and practical insight by analogy
to the present discussion. More specifically, the fact that a majority of
federal courts that have considered the question have held that "unsuccess-
ful bidders for government contracts have standing to invoke judicial
review of adverse procurement decisions""OS makes a general consideration
of federal procurement law highly relevant to this analysis.
In terms of procedure, standing within the federal procurement law
context can be defined as "a right to judicial review of the action of an
adminstrative agency "I' As the most authoritative case in this area,
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.'10 has proven to be a continuing obstacle for
disappointed bidders seeking judicial review of federal contract awards. In
rejecting a bidder's challenge to government wage determinations, the
United States Supreme Court stated that federal statutes controlling
government contract awards were enacted for the benefit ofthe government
alone, not prospective contractors.'08 Under this rationale, such contractors
lack the standing necessary to assert a claim.
Fortunately for unsuccessful bidders seeking meaningful judicial
review of a particular government contract award, numerous legal scholars
have recogmzed that the rule of Perkins has "eroded gradually over several
"0 Administrative Procedure Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994). In support of
this Note and its proposals, the APA provides that any "person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof." Id.
" Owen of Georgia, Inc. v Shelby County, 648 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir.
1981).
"0 Romualdo P Eclavea, Annotation, Standing of Unsuccessful Bidder for
Federal Procurement Contract to SeekJudicial Review ofAward, 23 A.L.R. FED.
301, 304 (1975).
"07 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
108 See id. at 126-27
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decades."'" Following Congressional enactment of the APA, various
decisions have granted disappointed bidders standing to bring an appropri-
ate bid protest action." ° The leading case is ScanwellLaboratories, Inc. v.
Shaffer,"' m which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
considered the claim of a second-lowest bidder on a government contract.
The court held that any unsuccessful bidder showing arbitrary or capricious
action on the part of a government agency or official has standing to sue
under the APA."2 Though the particulars of that Act are not relevant here,
the reasoning of the Scanwell holding directly supports the proposal and
arguments of tins Note."' The court poignantly proposed the following
rhetorical question: "If there is arbitrary or capricious action on the part of
any contracting [government] official, who is going to complain about it,
if not the party demed a contract as a result of the alleged illegal
activity'"" 4 Summarily stated, the trend m federal law generally supports
disappointed bidder standing to challenge government contract awards.' 5
The policy reasons discussed in both this and previous sections of this
Note".6 hold true regardless ofthejunsdiction in which they are considered.
Thus, the current state of federal procurement law strengthens a proposal
for change m Kentucky law generally to allow disappointed bidders
standing to assert a bid protest cause of action.
B. Suggested Liability Theories Under Which Disappointed Bidder
Standing Should Be Recognized
Despite the argument that Kentucky law and its standing require-
ments" 7 are excessively restrictive, it seems obvious that neitherpublic nor
"0 David R. Hazelton, The Federal Circuit's Emergng Role in Bid Protest
Cases, 36 AM. U. L. REV 919, 923 (1987).
"' See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
". Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
..
2 See zd. at 869.
"' See id. at 861-73.
"14 Id. at 866-67
115 For cases following Scanwell's holding that an unsuccessful bidder on a
federal procurement contract has standing to seek judicial review of an award of
contract to another bidder, see, for example, William F Wilke, Inc. v. Department
ofAnmy, 485 F.2d 180,182 (4th Cir. 1973); Curtiss-Wnght Corp. v. McLucas, 364
F Supp. 750, 756 (D.N.L 1973); Keco Indus. v Laird, 318 F Supp. 1361, 1363
(D.D.C. 1970).
136 See supra Part III.
17 See Healthamenca Corp. v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 697 S.W.2d 946,948
(Ky. 1985) (rejecting disappointed bidder standing in the absence of fraud,
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judicial policy favors unsuccessful bidder standing to challenge any and
every governmental action. Such a practice would result in waste of the
public funds that competitive bidding procedures are designed to protect,"'
as well as a significant burden upon already overcrowded trial dockets. As
such, the following discussion sets forth those liability theories that would
effectively limit generalized disappointed bidder standing to significant
claims but would simultaneously allow appropriate bidders to vindicate
their rights by challenging improper, but not necessarily fraudulent,
collusive, or dishonest governmental behavior. Such a compromise
approach would be preferable to current Kentucky standing doctnne and
would accord with the KMPC's stated purpose "[t]o insure the fair and
equitable treatment of all persons who deal with the procurement system
of the Commonwealth."'" 9
1. Implied Contract Doctrine
Though originating in and ordinarily applied within the federal
sphere, 120 the implied contract theory provides persuasive grounds for
granting a disappointed bidder standing to challenge a state or local public
contract award. Under implied contract principles, each governmentjob is
awarded with the understanding that every relevant bidder "possesse[s] the
right to have its bid fairly and honestly considered."' 2' Upon breach ofthis
obligation by the public authority in question, "the injured party has the
right to come into court to try and prove his cause of action.' 22
Directly contradicting the view that a public bid solicitation creates no
sufficient legal interests or contractual obligations," the theory of implied
contract sensibly recognizes that a contractor rej ectedunfatrly or arbitrarily
by the government has suffered an actionable wrong. 4 The fact that an
express contract is not yet in existence should not function to prevent a
valid clam based upon breach of an implied contract arising from the
collusion or dishonesty).
"I See 72 C.J.S. Supp. Public Contracts § 8 (1975).
19 K.R.S. § 45A.010(2)(e) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1998).
"I See Keco Indus. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233, 1236-38 (Ct. Cl. 1970);
Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F Supp. 409, 413 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
... Michael F. Mason, BidProtests and the U.S. District Courts-Why Congress
Should NotAllow the Sun to Set on This Effective Relationship, 26 PUB. CONT. L.J.
567, 574 (1997).
' Keco Indus., 428 F.2d at 1237
See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.1 See Keco Indus., 428 F.2d at 1238.
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competitive bidding process.'2s Furthermore, bid and proposal costs have
been considered recoverable damages for the government's arbitrary
disregard of a more advantageous offer in favor of a preferred bidder.26 In
light of these notions, a governmental breach of the implied requirement of
fairly considering all bids should be recognized as sufficient to support a
wronged bidder's protest claim. While not overly expansive, standing to
bring such an action furthers the fairness and equity policies underlying the
KMPC127 and is in the interest of contractors and the public generally
Kentucky standing doctrine should be changed accordingly
2. Correction of Bidding Mistakes
An additional theory under which a disappointed bidder should be able
to assert a bidprotest claim involves correction of another's bid by a public
official."' Such a complaint would arise where the plaintiffs lowest bid
was unfairly usurped by the bid of a competing bidder after the soliciting
public agency or officer chose to adjust or correct the competitor's bid. In
Armstrong & Armstrong, Inc. v. United States,29 the Ninth Circuit heard
the complaint of, and awarded bid preparation costs to, the disappointed
contractor and victim of such a scenario. In declaring that the awarding
government agency had acted arbitrarily, and therefore unlawfully, the
court relieduponboth inplied contract andpolicy considerations. 30 Noting
the inherent unfainess of subsequent bid alterations generally, the
Armstrongcourt concludedthat the "opportunityto second guess one's bids
after the bids have been opened subverts the competitive bidding process
and creates the potential for abuse that procurement regulations are
designed to prevent." '' Though fraud, collusion, or dishonesty might not
" See Gregg A. Day, The Bid Protest Jurisdiction of the United States Claims
Court: A ProposalforResolvingAmbiguities, 15 PUB. CONT. L.J. 325,331 (1984).
2 See Keco Indus., 428 F.2d at 1240 (recognizing the possibility of awarding
such damages but rejecting them under its particular facts); Heyer Prods. Co. v.
United States, 140 F Supp. 409, 409 (Ct. CI. 1956).
127 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
" See Armstrong & Armstrong, Inc. v. United States, 514 F.2d 402 (9th Cir.
1975).
129 Id.
130 See id. at 403. For further discussion of these policy considerations, see
Thomas J. Goger, Annotation, Recovery from United States of Costs Incurred by
Unsuccessful Bidder in Preparing and Submitting Contract Bid in Response to
Government Solicitation, 30 A.L.R. FED. 355,370 (1976).
"I Armstrong, 514 F.2d at 403.
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be present m such a bid correction situation, fairness and equity concerns
sufficiently substantiate and support the need for disappointed bidder
standing to sue under these or similar circumstances. Kentucky law should
be modified to allow suit under such a theory
3. BadFaith
Given a requirement of good faith on the part of an awarding govern-
ment agency-winch could be inferred from a reading of the KMPC and
its provisions132-a disappointed contractor should be permitted to assert
a bid protest claim on bad faith grounds. In Millette Enterprses, Inc. v.
State, 3 the court examined the actions of a particular public authority that
rejected all previously submitted bids, rewrote its bid specifications so that
only a bidder with whom the authority was presently associated could
qualify, and subsequently turned down the proposal of the prior low bidder.
The court acknowledged the existence of a low bidder's claim for liability
and damages. 34 Given an express statutory requirement of good faith, the
court declared that the unsuccessful bidder had a cause of action because
its allegations, assuming they were true, "established that the authority's
conduct was actionable as violating the fundamental purpose of the
procurement law to protect [the] public interest.' ' 35 The public authority's
actions caused the low bidder to waste resources in preparing a bid that
never had a chance. 36 Allowing such agency behavior would violate
applicable law, fairness principles, and public policy 137 In order to avoid
the possibility of reaching a different, undesirable holding on facts such as
these, Kentucky standing doctrine should be amended to follow Millette
Enterprises. Granting a disappointed bidder standing to challenge bad faith
on the part of an awarding government agency furthers private contractor
and public interests, and accords with the KMPC's fairness and equity
policies. 38
132 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
1 Millette Enters., Inc. v. State, 417 So. 2d 6 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
'
34 See id. at 9-10. For a further discussion of Millette and a similar case, see
James L. Isham, Annotation, Public Contracts: Low Bidder's Monetary Relief
A gainst State orLocalAgencyforNonawardofContract, 65 A.L.R. 4th 93,114-15
(1989).
135 Isham, supra note 134, at 115.
'
36 See Millette, 417 So. 2d at 9-10; see also Isham, supra note 134, at 115.
'
37 See Millette, 417 So. 2d at 5.
131 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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4. Failure to Negotiate
Assuming the existence of a statutory or other duty to negotiate with
all responsive and responsible bidders, failure by a public authority to
negotiate fairly should be recognized as sufficient grounds for a rejected
bidder's protest action. The court of ContinentalBusness Enterprses, Inc.
v. United States39 considered this issue under a federal statute that required
negotiation with "all responsible offerors who submit[ted] proposals within
a competitive range, price and other factors considered."'" The court
demed the government's motion for summary judgment because the
plaintiff' s evidence indicated a violation ofthis negotiation requirement. 41
Though the statute considered m ContinentalBusiness is inapplicable to the
issue, the court's recognition of a cause of action for bid preparation
expenses under such circumstances remains both relevant and significant
to this analysis. Generally stated, ContinentalBusiness's holding stands for
the proposition that the unsuccessful bidder who has been treated unfairly,
though not necessarily fraudulently or dishonestly, by an awarding agency
or official should be able to seekjudicial redress. Such an assertion follows
from the KMPC and its principles of fairness and equity,142 and should be
incorporated into Kentucky's standing law
VI. CONCLUSION:
A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE IN KENTUCKY LAW
Questions of whether a disappointed bidder has standing to challenge
an improperly awarded government contract are of crucial importance to
abusmess-onented society. Kentucky, no less than any other state andlocal
governmental entities, requires and must contract for professional services
and products on a regular basis. In addition to high quality performance,
the public demands and is entitled to a reasonable price for such services.
Competitive bidding procedures provide the means of achieving this goal.
Though the Kentucky Model Procurement Code represents a comprehen-
sive statute in this area, the administrative remedies it provides are clearly
inadequate unless and until they are supplemented by the possibility of
judicial review
9 Continental Bus. Enters., Inc. v. United States, 452 F.2d 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
140 Id. at 1020 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g) (1970)).
141 See id. at 1016.
142 See supra note 119 and accompanymg text.
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In spite of this most definite need, Kentucky's common law has
consistently limited the standing of an unsuccessful bidder to bring a bid
protest cause of action to those situations involving fraud, collusion, or
dishonesty. Such a restrictive standard does not serve the public interest,
and the law of this Commonwealth should be reconsidered and modified
to confer generalized standing upon disappointed bidders seeking review
in ajudicial forum.
A move toward broad recognition of unsuccessful bidder standing
would further the public interest, since only a rejected contractor, as
opposed to an individual taxpayer, possesses the resources and motivation
to monitor and challenge a particular bid award in a court of law Further-
more, an expansion of Kentucky's rules would help to ensure that a
disappointed bidder's contractual and proprietary interests in a public
contract award are adequately protected and fairly treated. Clearly, federal
procurement law, both in its development and policies, supports such a
change. Finally, there exist numerous liability theories other than fraud,
collusion, or dishonesty under which an unsuccessful bidder would be able
to recover for improper governmental behavior without harming the public
interest or overly burdening the judiciary In light of these assertions,
Kentucky's standing doctrine and the current common law rule must be
amended to give a disappointed bidder standing to sue an awarding entity
for any significant impropriety in the competitive bidding process. Even
without fraud, collusion, or dishonesty, a party whose interests have been
wrongfully deprived has a right to be heard. Thejudiciary from whom such
a party seeks a forum for relief should unequivocally recognize that right.
[VOL. 88
